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Abstract
In What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon formulated a new version of the ethical theory 
called contractualism. This theory took reasons – considerations that count in favour of 
judgment-sensitive attitudes – to be the fundamental normative notion. It then used normative 
reasons to first account for evaluative properties. For an object to be valuable, on this view, is
for it to have properties that provide reasons to have favourable attitudes towards the bearer of 
value. Scanlon also used reasons to account for moral wrongness. His contractualism claims
that an act is morally wrong if it is forbidden by any set of moral principles that no one could 
reasonably reject.
My thesis consists of five previously published articles which attempt to clarify 
Scanlon’s theory and to defend it against its critics. The first article defends the idea that 
normative reason-relations are fundamental against Joshua Gert. He argued that rationality is
a more basic notion than reasons and that reasons can be analysed in terms of their rationally
requiring and justifying dimensions. The second article explores the relationship between 
value and reasons. It defends Scanlon’s view according to which reasons are the more basic 
than value against those who think that reasons are based on the evaluative realm.
The last three articles defend Scanlon’s views about moral wrongness. The first one of 
them discusses a classic objection to contractualist theories. This objection is that principles 
which no one could reasonably reject are redundant in accounting for wrongness. This is 
because we need a prior notion of wrongness to select those principles and because such 
principles are not required to make actions wrong or to provide reasons against wrong actions. 
The fourth article explores the distinctive reasons which contractualists claim there are for 
avoiding the wrong actions. The last article argues against the critics of contractualism who 
claim that contractualism has implausible normative consequences for situations related to the 
treatment of different-sized groups of people.
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5Introduction
1. Preface
For some reason, I have always been quite impressed with Popper’s falsificationism in the 
philosophy of science (see Popper (1958)). The original purpose of this theory was to provide 
a demarcation criterion for which of the actual activities of investigation count as real, 
empirical sciences (Popper 1958, 34–9). The critics of the view may be right that for this 
purpose the criterion is too strict. For good reasons, we want to count some of the lines of 
investigation and their practices which fail to satisfy Popper’s criterion as science (see Kuhn 
(1970, 7), Kneale (1974, 217), and Maxwell (1974, 292)).
Despite of this problem, however, I still believe that Popper succeeds in painting an 
ideal picture of how good scientific investigation should proceed – to what scientists should at 
least aim at in their work.1 Theoretical hypothesis should be put forward to explain and 
predict natural phenomena. After this, they should be tried to be falsified by testing their 
internal consistency, explanatory power in comparison to earlier theories, and empirical 
adequacy through experimentation (Popper 1958, 39–41).
In addition to sciences, I believe that suitably applied this model also provides an ideal 
for how philosophical investigation should proceed.2 Philosophical theories should first be put 
forward as attempts to provide new means for helping us to understand and solve the 
philosophical and conceptual problems which puzzle us. After this, they should be attempted 
to be refuted in philosophical debates. Even though this is often done by showing that the 
considered problem is a pseudo-problem in the first place, the proposed theories still need also 
critics who try to search for internal incoherencies, false premises, invalid arguments and 
thought-experiments in which the theory provides false answers.
This process should not be too one-sided. The criticisms of a theory should undergo a 
similar critical process as the criticised theory itself. Therefore, the evaluated theories need
also defenders for assessing the critics’ objections. The criticisms fail to refute the theory if 
                                                
1 It is not clear whether Popper even meant to suggest that his view provided necessary and sufficient conditions 
for picking out empirical sciences from the current, actual investigating practices. Instead, in places, he too 
seems to offer his view as a ‘proposal or a convention’ for the ‘aims of science’, and makes it clear that the 
theory is ‘guided by value judgements’ (Popper 1958, 37–8). 
2 Popper too believed that rational discussion is essential for both philosophy and sciences, and that the 
rationality in both mainly consists of evaluating critically the proposed solutions to the investigated problems 
(Popper 1958, 15–6). 
6they are based on misunderstandings, incoherencies, bad arguments, and so on. In many 
cases, the defenders of the theory can, on the basis of the objections, develop their view to 
more sophisticated forms which can stand the previous objections. Through this process we
are able to gain new philosophical insights. We can thank the process, for instance, for the 
development of naive forms of Ayerian emotivism to the ingenious forms of sophisticated 
expressivism by Blackburn, Gibbard and Ridge.3
This image of philosophical investigation is the basis of my thesis. In 1998, after 19 
years of work, T.M Scanlon finally published a book called What We Owe to Each Other
(Scanlon 1998 (hereafter WWO)).4 This book is the definitive statement of a view in moral 
theory called contractualism. Its main aim was to provide new understanding about the nature 
of moral wrongness. As a comprehensive theory of ethics, it also attempts to shed light on
other related subjects such as practical reasons, value, well-being, moral responsibility, 
promises, relativism, and so on. Scanlon’s book immediately drew a lot of critical attention. 
Almost all important philosophical journals published within few years critical evaluations of 
Scanlon’s contractualism, and some even went on to publish theme issues on the topic.5
However, the fact that Scanlon’s theory became a subject of a large amount of criticism 
does not itself falsify the view. In assessing whether the view ought to be dismissed as a result 
of the criticisms, we need to assess critically the criticisms themselves. We need to see 
whether the critics’ arguments hit their mark successfully, and, in the case that they do,
whether we could improve contractualism in ways that can avoid the presented problems.
It is at this point where the work of my thesis comes in. It is an attempt to defend 
Scanlon’s contractualism against its critics. Of course, it cannot reply to all the criticisms 
presented already for the reasons of space. For such a comprehensive defense, far too many 
objections have been put forward against the view. However, I hope that I have been able to 
pick out some of the most pressing and interesting problems of the view. I also hope that I 
have been able to defend the view against these problems satisfactorily. As a result, I believe 
that we can still count contractualism as a viable view for helping us to understand many, 
sometimes puzzling, features of morality and wrongness.
                                                
3 The staggering extent of this development becomes obvious when one compares, for instance, Ayer (1936, ch. 
6) to Blackburn (1998), Gibbard (2003), and Ridge (2006).
4 Prior to the publication of the book, Scanlon had published a series of articles in which he developed his 
contractualist view. These papers started from the classic “Contractualism and Utilitarianism” (Scanlon 1982).
5 See Ethics (2002, vol. 112 (3)), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2003, vol. 66 (1)), Ratio (2004, 
vol. 16 (4)), and Social Theory and Practice (2002, vol. 28 (2)).
7In this introductory essay, I will attempt to provide an outline of Scanlon’s 
contractualism as I read it. During this outline, I will point out the features of the view which I 
try to defend against the attacks of the critics. The rest of my thesis will consist of five self-
standing, previously published articles where the defense of contractualism takes place in 
detail. These articles are the following:
Article 1: “Normativity of Reasons – a Critical Notice of Joshua Gert’s Brute Rationality”.
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (4), 2004, pp. 478–491.
Article 2: “Reasons and Value – In Defence of the Buck-Passing Account”. Ethical Theory 
and Moral Practice 7 (5), 2005, pp. 513–535.
Article 3: “Contractualist Replies to the Redundancy Objections”. Theoria 71 (1), 2005, pp. 
38–58.
Article 4: “Contractualist Account of Reasons for Being Moral Defended”. Sats – Nordic 
Journal of Philosophy 6 (2), 2005, pp. 93–113.
Article 5: “What We Owe to Many”. Social Theory and Practice 30 (4), 2004, pp. 485–506.
82. Scanlon’s Project
In order to understand Scanlon’s contractualism, it is important to pay attention to the initial, 
general theoretical framework to which the different, more specific elements of the view are 
supposed to fit. This framework, which is often overlooked, is presented in the introduction of 
WWO.
The main question to which Scanlon wants contractualism to provide an answer is 
‘[W]hen we claim that an action is wrong, what kind of judgment are we making?’ (WWO, 1).
Or, in other words, how should we characterise the subject matter of judgments about right 
and wrong (ibid.)?
Traditionally, there has been two ways of trying to go about answering this question
(see Blackburn (1985) and Gibbard (2003, 10). Many cognitivists (including many non-
naturalists, naturalists and error theorists), who claim that moral judgments express beliefs,
begin answering this question by attempting to directly say something about the moral 
property of wrongness, and what it is or would be like. The view is that the moral property of 
being wrong provides the truth-conditions of our beliefs about wrongness and therefore also 
the content of our beliefs. In contrast, so-called non-cognitivists (or expressivists), who deny 
the truth-aptness of moral claims and mental states, often begin from the alleged action-
producing role played by the judgments about wrongness and then go on to theorize what 
sorts of desire-like mental states could play this role.
Scanlon, as a constructivist about wrongness, deviates from these traditional lines of 
thought from the beginning. He hopes that he can shed light on the nature of the judgments 
about wrongness by concentrating on how people arrive at such judgments in their moral 
deliberation (WWO, 2). If we can characterise this thought-process sufficiently well and 
understand why we would take judgments arrived at in this way as seriously as we take moral 
judgments, then this would be enough to dispel any remaining philosophical and metaphysical 
concerns about the nature of wrongness.
Scanlon hopes to ground his contractualism on his observation that we come to 
judgments about wrongness as a result of judgments about certain kinds of practical reasons. 
More specifically, Scanlon claims that the way in which we come to judge that an act is 
wrong is via first thinking about what kind of reasons people would have for making 
objections against a principle which allowed the given act. These reasons are then compared
9to the reasons which there would be for making objections against the alternative forbidding 
principle (WWO, 3–5).
All the reasons we compare in this process are based on the kind of burdens which 
people would have to bear if a certain principle was generally adopted. As a result of such 
comparisons, the principle which is such that there would be bigger objections against all 
other principles is finally the one we can expect all reasonable persons to accept. On the basis 
of this observation, Scanlon then makes the contractualist claim that an act is wrong if it is 
disallowed by any principle that no-one could reasonably reject (WWO, 3).
This identification of wrongness as the property of being forbidden by the principles 
that no-one could reasonably rejected is further supported by other observations about the 
notion of wrongness and its role in our moral practices. First of all, this view about wrongness
fits our intuitive judgments about which acts are wrong (WWO, 4). It seems clear to us that 
wanton killings are wrong. The contractualist grounds this intuition on the fact that the 
victims of such killings can reasonably reject principles which did not forbid such killings on 
the basis of the obvious burdens to them.
Second, the view promises to offer functioning and non-mysterious standards of 
correctness for making judgments about wrongness. Finally, and most importantly, the 
account seems to be able to provide an explanation of the specific sorts of reasons we think 
we have for not doing acts which are morally wrong. Scanlon claims that by ensuring that we 
are able to justify our actions to others on the contractualist grounds we are able to form
highly valuable relations with them (more on this in the section 5).
This then is a very brief outline of the contractualist framework which Scanlon created
in his introduction to WWO. The rest of Scanlon’s book consists of an attempt to explain and 
illuminate the concepts on which the account is built, to defend them as philosophically 
‘kosher’, to argue for the substantial claims about reasons and certain valuable relations on 
which the view relies, to draw out the ethical and philosophical implications of the view, and 
to defend the view against various obvious objections. I will introduce next the central 
elements of this account in a little bit more detail in the same order as they appear in
Scanlon’s book. At the same time, I will also point out the problems of the view which will be
discussed later on in the main articles of this thesis.
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3. Practical Reasons
Above, we saw that Scanlon’s project is to given an account of moral wrongness in terms of 
reasons for making objections against alternative sets of moral principles and the reasons we 
have for avoiding actions that are forbidden by the set which no-one can reasonably reject. As 
a result, one might think that how much this account can help us to understand the notion of
moral wrongness depends on how well Scanlon can explain what practical reasons are. 
Furthermore, as Scanlon refuses to give an explanatory account of practical reasons, one 
might think that he fails to illuminate moral wrongness by his own standards (WWO, 17).
This criticism, however, is too hasty. According to the widely accepted Wittgensteinian 
dictum, all explanations must come to an end somewhere (Wittgenstein 1958, sec. 1). If we 
want to avoid circular explanations, we must find philosophical bed-rocks, basic notions in 
terms of which we begin to account for other, more complex puzzling phenomena. Scanlon 
claims that practical reasons are one such bed-rock. For him, the idea of a reason is primitive 
(WWO, 17). Even though reasons can be used to explain other notions like moral wrongness, 
reasons themselves cannot be explained in terms of more basic concepts or properties.
Does this imply that Scanlon fails to give an illuminating account of moral wrongness? 
Not necessarily. Even if the idea of reasons was a primitive one and reasons cannot be 
reductively analysed in terms of other concepts, one may still hope to be able to illuminate 
and elucidate the idea of reasons with other related terms and to dispel skeptical worries. In 
this way, one can unearth the basic understanding we have about reasons and defend the idea 
that, because there are no good reasons to be skeptical about practical reasons, one should not 
have any skeptical worries with regards to moral wrongness either.
The picture Scanlon provides about practical reasons is simple. First, the considerations
that are practical reasons are supposed to belong to an ordinary ontological class. One of 
Scanlon’s examples is a feature of a hat which he is going to buy – its colour.6 What is 
significant about reasons is then not which considerations are reasons but rather what it is for 
these things to have the status of being a reason.
The status of being a reason is, according to Scanlon, to be understood in terms of a sui 
generis normative relation of ‘being a reason for’ something. Can we say more about this 
                                                
6 Scanlon goes on to specify that the reasons are the potential contents of our beliefs, i.e., propositions (WWO, 
56–7). There are interesting philosophical disagreements about what contents of our beliefs or propositions are. 
Jonathan Dancy has argued that more plausibly reasons are states of affairs or facts (Dancy 2000a, 126–8). On 
some views about contents of our beliefs these views come to the same thing. 
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relation? We might say things like to be a reason for something is to ‘count in favour of’ it
(WWO, 17). The ‘counting in favour’ relation however fails as a strict analysis of ‘being a 
reason for’, because the question ‘How does something count in favour of something else?’ 
leads us directly back to the idea of ‘by being a reason’. The idea of counting in favour of is 
also unhelpful if we tried to explain the notion of reasons for those who do not already grasp 
the basic idea.
What are the reasons then reasons for – what do they count in favour of? Scanlon claims 
that reasons are for and against having judgment sensitive attitudes such as ‘beliefs, 
intentions, hopes, fears’, and of ‘admiration, respect’, and so on (WWO, 20). These attitudes 
are identified by their functional roles in human psychology (WWO, 21). Their essential 
property (i.e., what makes an individual attitude a judgment sensitive one) is that, if a properly 
functioning rational agent judges that she has sufficient reason to adopt one such attitude, 
then, by that token, she comes to have that attitude. Similarly, if a rational agent comes to 
judge that she has sufficient reason not to have one such attitude, then, as a result, she no 
longer has the attitude. In this sense, the fact that the attitudes of rational agents are favoured 
and disfavoured by reasons is enabled by the fact that it is ‘up to the agents’ and their 
judgments about reasons which attitudes they end up having.
In its very essentials, this is the framework of practical reasons which Scanlon offers for 
us. One task he does not take himself to have is to provide an answer for a wholesale skeptic 
who denies that there are such things as practical reasons at all.7 In a way, other, local 
skeptical views about practical reasons do not threaten Scanlon’s contractualism. These views 
might have consequences on which set of moral principles no-one can reasonably reject and 
on who have reasons, and of what kind, not to do acts that are forbidden by this set. But, it 
may be that contractualism can, by and large, survive such consequences. Scanlon’s main aim 
in his account of practical reasons is to dispel two frequently discussed sources of worries 
about practical reasons – one based on the role of desires in practical reasoning and one based 
on metaphysical problems of locating reason-relations in the world.
In discussing how desires relate to practical reasons, Scanlon is forced to give an 
account of practical rationality. Scanlon’s own view is that minimal practical rationality is 
                                                
7 Scanlon says that such a position would be internally unstable (WWO, 19). Perhaps a global error theory about 
all normative talk would be such a view (see Mackie (1977, ch. 1), and Streumer (manuscript)). According to 
this position, all claims about reasons would be false, because there are no reasons for anything. For a 
convincing argument against error theories in ethics see Shafer-Landau (2006).  
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constituted of a basic ability or a disposition that enables agents’ beliefs, desires, intentions, 
fears, and so on to track the agents’ judgments about reasons for having such attitudes.8 This 
view is to be contrasted with the so-called Humean accounts of practical rationality which are 
based on the ‘desire-in, desire-out’ principle (Wallace 2006a, 30). 
According to the Humean models, in order for one to become motivated by a judgment 
about reasons, one must either have a standing, general desire to do whatever one judges 
oneself to have reason to do, or one must have an antecedent desire to do the thing in question
which one judges one has reason to do, or a desire to do something for which acting according 
to the reason-judgment would be instrumental. Desiring to do something can only be 
explained by some prior desire. Scanlon does not discuss the first Humean possibility above.9
Instead, he wants to argue against the latter requirements for the having of practical reasons.
If it were true that, when making judgments about reasons, one can only become 
motivated to do something as a result of some relevant prior desire, then without such prior
motivation it would be impossible to come to desire to do whatever one takes oneself to have 
reason to do in the given situation. Furthermore, if acting in this way would require desiring 
to do so, then it would be in this case impossible for the agent to do what she has judged she 
has reason to do. Yet, like ‘ought implies can’, having a reason to do something seems to 
require that it is possible act in the way required by the reason (Streumer forthcoming). This 
thought leads to so-called reasons-internalism. This thesis can be loosely put as follows: One 
can only have a reason to do something (or have some attitude) if doing the act in question 
would serve some antecedent motivation belonging to one’s subjective motivation set 
(Williams 1995).
Two significant consequences for contractualism would follow from this limitation. 
First, the objections which agents could make against alternative moral sets would depend on 
the antecedent motivations of the agents. If someone was not motivated by the thought of 
being tortured, then, on the Humean view, she would not have a reason to complain against 
principles which allowed torture. Second, if someone was not motivated to seek the valuable
relations on which contractualism grounds our reasons not to act wrongly, then she would not 
                                                
8 For attempts to give more sophisticated philosophical accounts of such a disposition, allegedly constitutive of 
practical agency, see Smith (1994, sec. 5.10) and Wallace (2006b). Scanlon contrasts his view of minimal 
rationality with ideal rationality which in addition requires making correct judgments about practical reasons 
(WWO, 25–32).
9 Smith has argued that, if becoming motivated by reason-judgments were explained by such general desires, this 
would make the motivation to act morally fetishistic morally speaking (Smith 1994, 73–76).
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necessarily have reasons to follow the set of principles that no-one could reasonably reject. In 
this case, she might not even have reasons not to do acts that are wrong.10 Both of these 
consequences for Scanlon’s view are highly problematic.
Scanlon’s strategy for discharging these Humean challenges is to argue that there is no 
understanding of desires under which the substantial antecedent motivations would be 
required for becoming motivated by reasons-judgments (WWO, 37–41). He agrees with the 
Humeans that there is a broad, philosophical sense of desires which implies that all action 
requires having a desire, a pro-attitude, towards the state of affairs that is intended to be 
brought about with the action (WWO, 37). But, these states as such do not motivate us to act.
Rather, these states are states of being motivated, which then on occasion make us act. We 
can ask of these states what motivated us to adopt them, and thus what ultimately motivated 
us to act.
Do other desires have the ability to lead us to be in the states of being motivated to do 
something? According to Scanlon, some have and others do not. His view is that desires have 
the power to motivate us only in so far as they implicitly include seeing the object of the 
desire as good or reason-providing. It is a typical feature of occurrent desires that they keep 
directing our attention to such evaluative features of the object (WWO, 39–40). There are 
desires which do not involve this element, but these we see as mere urges. We usually see
them as external forces working in us rather than as something that motivates us to act. 
Furthermore, if the motivating force of desires goes back to seeing something as good or 
reason-giving, then there would be only weak grounds for the Humean objection that reason-
judgments themselves as formations of beliefs cannot make us to be motivated to act 
independently of the antecedent desires (see Wallace (2006a)).
Independent of whether only desires can motivate us to action, a similar internalist 
conclusion would be true if it turned out that desires are the source of our practical reasons. 
On this view, reasons acquire their normative force to rationally justify our actions from an 
appropriate relation to furthering the satisfaction of our desires. Intuitively, such a view may 
sound plausible. If I want to buy a new pair of jeans, then I have a reason to go to the shop 
where they are sold. 
                                                
10 One can find traces of the Humean model from Scanlon’s first formulation of contractualism. There, Scanlon 
grounded our reasons for not doing wrong acts on a general, widespread desire to be able to justify one’s actions 
to others with a reference to principles that no-one could reasonably reject (Scanlon 1982).
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Scanlon attempts to resist this view about the sources of normativity by arguing that, 
even though desires may affect what reasons we have, the source of justification cannot be 
traced back to them (WWO, 43). A basic desire to eat mud does not have the power to 
rationalise actions of an agent who desires to act in this way. No matter how she desires to eat 
mud, she does not acquire a reason to do so. However, saying this does not force us to deny 
that desires can affect what reasons we have. One way of accommodating this intuition is to 
say that, once we have adopted a plan to pursue some goal, this gives us derivative reasons to 
take into account things that help us in carrying out that plan and to ignore reasons for doing 
other things. However, such reasons are not given by our wanting to carry out the plan but 
rather they are derivative from the reasons there are to carry out the plan in the first place 
(WWO, 45–6).11
The second set of worries about practical reasons is based on philosophical, 
metaphysical considerations. If practical reasons were metaphysically untenable, then 
wrongness, as accounted for in terms of reasons, would inherit the same problems. Taken at 
face value, our talk and beliefs about reasons are about ‘counting in favour of’ relations 
between things in the world and our judgment-sensitive attitudes. This gives rise to the so-
called ‘location problem’ of finding the reason-relations from the world as it is understood by 
our scientific world-view (Jackson 1998, ch.1). In this respect, it would be comforting if we 
could analyse claims about reasons in terms of claims about natural properties and relations. 
Scanlon is hesitant about going down this route because of the open question arguments that 
can be put forward against such naturalistic views (WWO, 57–58).12
This appears to leave him with two choices. His first option would be to accept that 
judgments about reasons are about sui generis, non-natural relations in the world. This would 
imply having to defend, on the threat of error theory, the idea that such relations can really be 
found from the world. His second option would be to agree with the expressivists that 
judgments about reasons are not descriptive but rather express special, desire-like attitudes. 
These judgments could, for instance, express accepting a norm of treating a consideration as 
counting in favour of an attitude (see WWO (58) and Gibbard (1990, 163)). Furthermore, as 
                                                
11 Of course reasons can be given by other subjective considerations. That I enjoy eating coffee ice-cream gives 
me a reason to eat that kind of ice-cream. I would not have such a reason if I didn’t like its taste.
12 There are naturalistic accounts that at least seem to be unaffected by the traditional open question argument 
either because they are openly revisionistic or because they make use of the sense/reference distinction (see, for 
instance, Railton (1986)). Whether they are successful in avoiding the open question argument is questionable 
(see Horgan and Timmons (1992)).
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Scanlon accounts for wrongness-judgments in terms of judgments about reasons, he faces the 
same choices also in the case of wrongness – either it is a non-naturalistic property reducible 
to reasons, or wrongness claims express acceptances of norms of treating considerations as 
reasons.
Scanlon wants to show that his account of reasons and wrongness are not threatened by 
the forced decision between the metaphysically suspect realism and the truth-aptness denying 
expressivism. He thinks that there is room to maneuver between these lemmas. In my 
interpretation, he does this by formulating a constructivist proposal.13
On this proposal, contrary to what the expressivists say, judgments about reasons are
truth-apt. However, when they are true, they are not made true by the robust, in-the-world 
normative reason-relations (WWO, 60). Rather, what it is for judgments about reasons to be 
true is for them to be outcomes of epistemically satisfactory procedures of making these 
judgments. In an analogical way, judgments about arithmetic are not made true by a Platonic 
universe of abstract objects, numbers, but rather by the procedural standards of arithmetical 
reasoning (WWO, 63). Similarly, the appropriate standards of practical reasoning create the 
standards of correctness for judgments about reasons. In the current minimalist fashion, the
truth of the judgments can be identified with these procedural standards. Scanlon thus seems 
to be able to by-pass the metaphysical commitments which traditionally have been thought to 
follow from truth-aptness.
Towards the end of his account of reasons, Scanlon attempts to describe the deliberation 
procedures which confer warrant for the judgments about reasons (WWO, 64–76). According 
to him, a natural starting point is the inevitable ‘seemings to be reasons’ that we come to 
experience. When something seems to be a reason for us, we can critically reflect whether we 
really want to judge that the consideration in question is a reason. We can ask questions like 
‘What the reason-providing consideration in question really is?’, ‘What kind of a reason this 
consideration is supposed to provide?’, ‘How this reason fits to the other judgments about 
reasons we are committed to?’, ‘Is there an interpersonal agreement about the given reason?’, 
and so on. If the reason-judgment passes these deliberative tests, then, in the words of David 
Wiggins, there is nothing else left to think than that the consideration is a reason (Wiggins 
1991, 66 and 80). As a result, if wrongness-judgments are judgments about reasons, then this 
constructivist account also extends to the case of wrongness.
                                                
13 Here my reading of Scanlon follows Timmons’ interpretation against Street’s (Timmons 2004, Street 
manuscript).
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The first article of my thesis, “Normativity of Reasons – a Critical Notice of Joshua 
Gert’s Brute Rationality” tries to defend Scanlon’s account of practical reasons against a
serious challenge posed by Joshua Gert. In a series of articles and a recent book, Gert argues 
against Scanlon that the basic normative notion cannot be reasons but rather rationality (Gert 
2000, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, and 2004).
Gert’s argument begins from our pre-theoretical judgments about rationality of actions 
in certain cases. It then proceeds to show that no view based on the single reason-relations 
could explain these intuitions. Instead, according to Gert, our rationality-judgments reveal that 
the notion of reasons can be analysed further into two distinct normative relations. These are 
the ability to rationally speaking require actions and the ability to rationally speaking justify 
actions. If this was right, then Scanlon’s basic account of reasons would be wrong and his 
account of wrongness would be lacking a solid foundation.
I argue against Gert by showing that the attempt to analyse reasons in terms of two 
distinct normative forces has untenable consequences. I also show that we can account for the 
rationality-judgments in his examples by taking into account the moral reasons described by 
contractualism. As a result, we can continue to believe that the basic normative notion is 
reasons.
Of course, many other objections have been made against Scanlon’s views about 
reasons, rationality, and desires. Unfortunately, I have no room to discuss these objections in 
this work. However as many of these objections are not based on the wholesale skepticism 
about these notions, their consequences for contractualism are quite likely to be less 
catastrophic.14
                                                
14 For interesting critical discussions of Scanlon’s views about these issues, see, for instance, Marshall (2003), 
Copp & Sobel (2002), and Arkonovich (2001).
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4. Value and Well-Being
As described earlier, Scanlon’s main proposal is that, when we make judgments about 
wrongness, we are thinking about practical reasons. According to an obvious and probably the 
most popular alternative, when we judge that some act is wrong, what we are thinking of is
rather the value of the options open for us. On this view, the evaluative notion of value is the 
basic normative notion that is the fundamental object of all our moral and normative thinking.
This value-based alternative has been most influential in the consequentialist moral 
theories which are a part of a larger family of teleological views about reasons, value and 
rationality. The core of such views consists of two claims. According to the first, the sole 
bearers of value are states of affairs.15 The relevant states of affairs here are the ones which 
agents have the ability to bring about. According to the second, the value of the states of 
affairs determines the reasons one has to bring about those states of affairs and thus also 
whether it is right or wrong to bring about them.
The second essential claim in teleology is thought to be a formal feature of the very idea 
of value – it is to be promoted and brought about. This feature itself can be based either on the 
view that claims about reasons can be analysed in terms of comparative value of options, or 
on the idea that values are uniquely reason-providing properties.16 The result of this 
teleological framework is in any case that, when we think about reasons or about wrongness,
we fundamentally must be thinking about how valuable the different states of affairs which 
we could bring about are. 
We can recognise the appeal of the abstract teleological framework when we look at a 
familiar view which is build around it by adding certain optional parts to it. Consider a 
version of naïve utilitarianism which is a sum of two elements – hedonism and 
consequentialism. This view begins from an axiology which defines value in terms of a 
feature with which different states of affairs are to be compared. The only consideration of 
value, in this view, is pleasure. Furthermore, pleasure is valuable impartially – everyone’s 
pleasure is just as valuable and important. And finally, value is additive.
These claims give us criteria with which we can form a ranking of all states of affairs 
from the most valuable one that contains most pleasure and least pain to the least valuable one 
                                                
15 Many philosophers in the teleological tradition understand the notion of states of affairs rather inclusively as to 
include acts, processes, and so on.
16 G.E. Moore defended the first view in Principia Ethica (Moore 1903, Sec. 17). The latter view is also often 
attributed to him, but it is uncertain whether he ever held it (see Dancy (2000b)).
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that contains most pain and least pleasure. The consequentialist element of the view then 
asserts that one has most reason to bring about the most valuable states of affairs, and that it is 
right to do so and wrong to act in any other way. The heart of this latter part of the theory
seems to be the intuitive maximizing conception of rationality (Scheffler 1985, 414).
Scanlon tries to resist the conflicting teleological framework in two ways. His first 
argument against the teleological views relies on examples. They attempt to show that, in the 
case of the given values, certain important reasons we have for acting in the appropriate ways 
in relation to those values cannot be understood in the teleological framework of values and 
reasons (WWO, ch.2, sec. 2–3). For this reason, if we adopt the teleological way of 
understanding values and reasons, this will distort our view of what reasons we have in a way 
that has unfortunate effects.
Scanlon’s best example of a value which status as a value ‘is simply not, or even 
primarily, a matter of thinking that certain states of the universe are better than others and are 
therefore to be promoted’ is that of the value of friendship (WWO, 88). On the teleological 
construal, states of affairs that include more friendship-relations have more value. This
additional value gives us reasons to act in ways which promote the existence of friendship. 
The problem with this understanding of the value is that it makes acts of friendship 
problematically instrumental for creating certain states of affairs. It also makes the reasons we 
have for doing friendly acts derivative reasons based on our teleological reasons for bringing 
about the valuable state of affairs. Yet, thinking that our friends themselves are not the source 
of our reasons for our friendly acts distorts our relation to them. 
Scanlon’s alternative picture begins from the idea that valuing friendship is a matter of 
recognizing the practical reasons involved in friendship-relations as good reasons. This 
requires accepting the non-teleological reasons for being loyal, for being concerned about the 
friends’ interests,  for trying to stay in touch and spend time with the other, and so on. The
value of friendship is then just the fact that these reasons are good reasons – that the features 
of the person who are our friends and the relation we can form with them really ground our 
reasons for acting in the way as good friends act (WWO, 89).
That some values cannot be understood in the teleological framework is of course not
an argument against the idea that other values have the teleological structure. The significance 
of such examples is, however, to prepare us for Scanlon’s own general account of value – the 
so-called buck-passing account (WWO, ch. 2, sec. 4). In the teleological view, the value of the 
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future states of affairs is the ground of our practical reasons. In contrast, according to the 
buck-passing account, for an object or states of affairs to have value just is for it to have
features that give us reasons for certain attitudes like admiration and for certain typical ways 
of acting with respect to the given object. This would mean that, even if in thinking about the
wrongness of our acts we would make a reference to some values, we would ultimately be 
thinking about the reasons that are given by the object which has value. 
My second article, “Reasons and Value – In Defence of the Buck-Passing Account”, is a 
defence of Scanlon’s general theory of value. It begins by attempting to show that even the 
ways in which the defenders of the teleological view have tried to reformulate their views to 
avoid Scanlon’s objections remain problematic. It then argues against Jonathan Dancy to the 
conclusion that certain alternatives for both the teleological view and the buck-passing view 
are untenable (Dancy 2000b). The paper ends with an attempt to show that the buck-passing 
view can avoid the problems of the other views and that the view can avoid certain alleged 
problems.17
Scanlon’s attempt to downplay the importance of values in our thinking about 
wrongness ends with a discussion of the substantive value of well-being (WWO, ch. 3). The 
notion of well-being is usually brought up in the moral argumentation. It has been thought to 
be a ‘master value’ which is located in the very core in our moral thinking. Many have 
thought that it acquires this special status by being the unique basis for the choices of rational
individuals. Other things are valuable for rational agents only in so far as they contribute to
their well-being. For this reason, well-being has been thought to be the ground on which the 
interests of individuals should be taken into account in moral theory (WWO, 108–9, see 
Bentham 1970, 11). In line with his general buck-passing theory of value, Scanlon tries to 
undermine this picture by arguing that, from the perspective of the rational individual, the 
value of well-being is instead ‘transparent’ and ‘inclusive’.   
The thought is that when we plan how to live and decide what to do (for instance, 
whether to pursue a career in circus or go sailing over the weekend), what we are thinking 
about is how valuable such aims and pursuits would be. Translated in the buck-passing 
language, this means thinking about what reasons there would be for us to act in these ways. 
However, the consideration we direct our attention to at this point in our individual 
                                                
17 The buck-passing account of value has created a small industry of literature for and against it. For this reason 
alone, I had no space to tackle all the problems which the view might have. For some of the most interesting 
recent arguments see Crisp (2005), Stratton-Lake (2005), Stratton-Lake & Hooker (2006), and Väyrynen (2006).
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deliberative perspectives is not the abstract notion of well-being, but rather the first-order 
features of the life in circus or the weekend spent sailing (WWO, ch. 3, sec. 4).
Saying this is not to deny that success in such choiceworthy goals makes our lives goes 
better. Rather, the point is that the notion of well-being does not help us to understand what 
reasons there are for pursuing objectives the satisfaction of which is part of what our well-
being consists of. Furthermore, the concept of well-being does not help us to compare the 
costs and benefits of the different options in terms of the factors that are conducive to well-
being (WWO, 126–8). Scanlon also argues that the boundaries of the notion of well-being are 
blurred – the meaning of well-being does not tell us which valuable projects would make our 
lives go better and which not. Therefore, there is no difference in importance, from the 
perspective of rationality, between the projects that contribute to our well-being and those that 
do not. What matters instead from the perspective of rationality is how good reasons there are 
for us to pursue the given goal independent of its importance to our well-being.  
If it were true that the notion of well-being is unimportant for us from our individual 
deliberative perspectives, then we should be suspicious about well-being’s role in our moral 
thought. Scanlon lists three potential roles which the notion of well-being could play in ethics 
(WWO, 137). First, well-being could figure in the content of moral requirements. There could 
be a potential moral requirement to improve the well-being of others. Second, well-being 
could play a role in the justification of the moral principles which we are required to follow. It 
could be claimed that moral principles get their justification as a result of maximizing the 
well-being of the society or the well-being of the worst-off individual. Third, well-being could 
help us to answer the justificatory questions for morality – the classic ‘Why should I be 
moral?’ question. 
Scanlon denies that well-being could play any of these roles. First, even though well-
being plays some role in certain moral principles (like in the ones that assess the justice of our 
basic social institutions), most of our important moral principles make no reference to well-
being at all (e.g., WWO, 139). Second, Scanlon claims that the notion of well-being is too 
indeterminate for being able to provide a quantitative standard for assessing the justification 
for and against alternative moral principles. There seems to be also little reason to think that 
considerations related to well-being are the sole consideration relevant for the justification of 
moral principles. Someone would seem to have a good objection against a moral principle 
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which denied her the possibility to pursue an unsuccessful but still choiceworthy career in art 
even if such a principle would ultimately improve the well-being of the person.
Finally, if the earlier conclusion was right and well-being does not guide our rational
decisions from our first-person deliberative perspectives, then the notion of well-being cannot
tell us why we should be moral, because this question is posed in that very perspective. To 
conclude, if Scanlon’s arguments against the importance of the value of well-being are sound,
then he is in much better position to argue that moral thinking is not about well-being but 
instead about our practical reasons.18
                                                
18 Unfortunately, none of the articles in this thesis cover Scanlon’s account of well-being and its role in 
contractualism. For illuminative discussions of the issue, see Wolff (2004) and Arneson (2002).
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5. Contractualist Ethics
Earlier on, I already introduced Scanlon’s central contractualist idea according to which when 
we think about wrongness, what we are thinking about are the reasons people have for making 
objections against alternative sets of moral principles and the reasons we have for doing acts 
which are not forbidden by the set of principles that no-one can reasonably reject. If the 
preliminaries in the first three chapters of WWO are plausible, then there should not be 
anything philosophically suspicious about the general idea that we are thinking about reasons 
in this case. But, why exactly should we be thinking about precisely the reasons Scanlon 
claims we are thinking about in this context? Why would our wrongness-thoughts be about
the reasons for rejecting alternative sets of moral principles and the reasons to follow the set 
preferred by Scanlon?
In my mind, Scanlon’s argument for his contractualist conclusion is an example of
abductive reasoning. It is an argument to the best explanation. We start from the question: 
What the property of moral wrongness would have to consist of in order for it to rationally 
support our wrongness-related moral and linguistic practices? In order to answer this question, 
we must first list what the relevant features of the practices are.
What are the relevant practices? Scanlon refers to five criteria for potential accounts of 
moral wrongness. First, whatever the property of moral wrongness is, it would have to be a 
property that fits our moral convictions of which acts have the property of wrongness. 
Second, that property would also have to be able to provide reasons that match in strength
with the reasons for not doing acts that are wrong (WWO, 148). Third, the features of this 
property would in addition have to explain why we take it to be so important that others 
recognise and act on these reasons. This would tell us why our relation changes significantly 
for the worse to those who are left cold by the moral wrongness of acts (WWO, 149).
Finally, fourth and fifth, the account would have to be able to avoid the horns of what 
Scanlon calls the ‘Prichard’s dilemma’ (WWO, 149–150). This means first that the account 
should not take the reason-providingness of moral wrongness as granted. It also means that
the account which illuminates the reason-providing nature of moral wrongness to us cannot 
ground our reasons for not doing wrong acts on grounds that are too external to our idea of 
acting from moral motives.
In his account of contractualism, Scanlon attempts satisfy these desiderata for accounts 
of moral wrongness by explicating and defending a view according to which the property of 
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wrongness is the property of being forbidden by the set of principles which no-one can 
reasonably reject (WWO, ch. 4–5). In the core of this account lies the notion of justification. It 
is supposed to both generate an extension of the contractualist property which fits our moral 
convictions about which acts are wrong and ground the appropriate kind of reasons we have 
for not doing wrong acts (WWO, 5). I’ll introduce first the role justification plays as a ground
of reasons and then its role in relation to the content of moral wrongness.
According to Scanlon, what provides our reasons for not doing acts that forbidden by 
the set of principles that no-one can reasonably reject is a valuable form of relation we are 
able to form with others when we are able to justify our actions to them with these principles
(WWO, 154, 162). Admittedly, the normative buck of the value of this relationship will have 
to be passed in Scanlon’s framework to features of the relationship that provide the more 
basic reasons for not doing the acts that are forbidden by the principles that no-one can 
reasonably reject.
In abstract, the main reason-providing feature of this relation is that, as we are able to 
justify our actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject, this enables us to 
express our respect of the rationality and reasonableness of others. By being willing to be able 
to justify our actions to them on grounds they can accept, we can show our appreciation of
their ability to make judgments about reasons and to act on them.19 More concretely, being 
able to justify our actions to others on grounds they can accept as reasonable persons gives us 
the good of being able to look into their eyes and not feel like shrinking under their gaze as 
one would if one acted unjustifiably (Pettit 2000, 149). 
Scanlon claims that grounding our reasons for avoiding wrong acts on the relation of 
‘mutual recognition’ described above gives an account of wrongness that does not merely 
assume the reason-providingness of wrongness but explains it in a way that is still not too 
external to our idea of morally motivated action (WWO, 155, 161–2). This would imply that 
his account has succeeded in solving Prichard’s dilemma.
                                                
19 It may seem like if our fundamental reasons are based on the ability of others to make judgments about 
reasons, then beings that do not have this ability are left implausibly outside the scope of morality. Scanlon 
discusses this problem in WWO (ch. 4, sec. 8). First, even if our core moral reasons are based on the notion of 
justifiability, this does not rule out that there are other moral reasons that might apply to the treatment of animals 
(WWO, 178, see also fn. 20 below). Second, it seems that the idea of thinking about being able to justify our 
actions to beings that cannot deliberate about reasons make sense. In this case, our reasons for being able to 
justify our actions to them on grounds they could accept if they could assess reasons might be grounded on some 
other consideration than the reciprocal relationship of ‘mutual recognition’. 
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Scanlon also tries to characterize the relationship in a way that shows us why it is so 
important for us that the reasons grounded by the relationship can outweigh other conflicting 
reasons. This happens in the same way as we think that the reasons we have for not doing 
wrong acts are overriding against other conflicting reasons (WWO, ch. 4, sec. 5). Part of this 
project of accounting for the priority of morality is to explain both how the relationship of 
‘mutual recognition’ must be compatible with each of us pursuing our important personal 
projects and relationships, and how also these projects, if worth pursuing, must be sensitive to 
the value of recognizing the equal moral status of others.
Furthermore, Scanlon claims that, if others are not willing to justify their actions to us 
on grounds which we could accept as reasonable persons, they deny us the respect we would 
deserve as equal practical deliberators. Being regarded as morally less worthy in this way 
makes us resentful and changes our relationship to them. This should explain the importance 
we attach to recognizing the reasons moral wrongness provides (WWO, ch. 4, sec. 4). If all of 
this is right, then Scanlon’s contractualism satisfies his last four desiderata for accounts of 
moral wrongness. The first desideratum can still prove out to be more difficult to satisfy. Are 
the acts that are forbidden by the principles which no-one can reasonably reject really those 
acts that we intuitively think are morally wrong?20 How do we even know which principles 
are such that no-one can reasonably reject them?
As mentioned earlier, the notion of justification is also supposed to shed light on which 
set of moral principles is such that it could not be reasonably rejected by anyone. After all, the 
purpose of these principles just is to provide grounds for justification that is constitutive of the 
relationships of ‘mutual recognition’. In order to see how the notion of justification can play 
this role, we must begin from the observation that we always attempt to justify our actions to 
other individuals. In this way, the notion of justification directs our attention to the individual 
stand-points from which justification is assessed (WWO, 202–6).
The agents to whom we address our justification can present objections against our 
actions from their standpoints on the basis of the burdens that are created for them as a result 
of others being allowed to do the kind of acts we are considering. In trying to justify our 
actions to them, we must refer to a moral principle which would allow our acting in the given 
                                                
20 Notice that satisfying this desideratum does not require that wrongness and being forbidden by the set of 
principles which no-one can reasonably reject are perfectly coextensive. It may be that there are acts that are not 
forbidden by the contractualist principles but which are still wrong. If this was true, then we would be using 
‘wrongness’ in an other sense when speaking about these acts and morality would be in some way ‘fragmented’ 
(see WWO (ch. 4, sec. 7).
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way. The question then is can those individuals for whom licensing our way of acting is 
burdensome reasonably reject the principles which we attempt to use for justification. The 
reasons they can use to attempt to reject our principles are the kind of generic, personal 
reasons based on the burdensome features of their lives to which we would contribute. These 
reasons are of the same type that we too would use to attempt to reject principles that would 
be burdensome to us (WWO, 204–5, 219). They include reasons like bodily injuries, inability 
to rely on the assurances of others and to pursue our personal projects, and so on (WWO, 204).
Whether they are good enough reasons for reasonable rejection is a comparative matter. 
It is a function of what kind of alternative, individual stand-points and objections based on 
personal, generic reasons would be created if some other set was generally adopted instead of
the one we are trying to use for justification. If there exists an alternative set of principles 
which does not create the kind of a significant burden to anyone which a given set would, 
then the person for whom the said unnecessary burden would be create can reasonably reject 
that set of principles (WWO, 195 and 205). The set of principles that no-one could reasonably 
reject then is such that all other sets create bigger objections against them from the 
standpoints of the individuals who live under them.
We can then assume that ‘reasonably rejectability’ thus described creates an extension 
of the acts that are forbidden by the set of principles that no-one can reasonably reject. If 
Scanlon claims that to belong to this extension is what is for acts to be wrong, then, given his
first desideratum, this extension would have to fit our moral convictions about which acts are 
wrong. But, why think this is the case? 
Scanlon’s argument to this conclusion begins from looking at our intuitive judgments 
about wrongness of acts. The observation is that we do not merely directly ‘see’ that acts are 
wrong, but rather come to think that they are wrong in virtue of some general characteristic 
they have (WWO, 197). The types of general characteristics on which we base our wrongness-
judgments are expressed by our basic moral principles such as ‘do not kill’, ‘do not steal’, 
‘help others in dire need if you can easily do so’, and so on. 
The thought then is that, if we look at these principles closely, we see that each one of 
them is making explicit certain reasons for actions. These reasons are based on different kinds 
of personal misfortunes from which each of these principles safeguards us.21 If these grounds 
                                                
21 It also looks like in cases where the basic moral principles allow for exceptions correspond to the ways in 
which absolute moral principles of the basic form could be reasonably rejected for hedged principles on the basis 
of the burdens which would be created by the absolute requirements (WWO, 199).
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for reasons are similar to the grounds we have for reasonable rejection, then it is not a surprise 
that the acts that are forbidden by the contractualist principles are the same ones that are 
wrong. In this way, Scanlon can argue that our intuitive moral thought just is the thought-
process which his contractualist framework makes explicit and systematic. If this is right, then 
Scanlon’s view satisfies also the first desideratum which he set for accounts of wrongness.
Therefore, the property of being forbidden by the contractualist principles can be the moral 
property which plays the role of moral wrongness in our moral practices.
I hope that this rough sketch of Scanlon’s sophisticated ethical theory provides a 
sufficient introduction even for the unacquainted reader to be able to appreciate the objections 
which I will tackle in my three last articles.22 These papers concentrate mainly on trying to 
reply to the following three sets of objections. 
The most repeated objection against contractualism is that, as an ethical theory, it is 
empty of content and therefore redundant.23 The analogy would be that contractualism is like 
an idle spinning wheel added to the motor of our moral thinking. It is useful to distinguish 
between two different ways in which this criticism is put forward. 
According to the first version of the objection, our judgments about which principles 
can be reasonably rejected are determined by our prior commitments about which actions are 
right and which wrong. The allowing of morally wrong acts seems to be the best reason to 
reject any set of moral principles. This line of thought guarantees trivially that the acts which 
we think are wrong are forbidden by the principles that no-one can reasonably reject. 
However, the circularity of the reasoning makes contractualism uninformative about the 
nature of wrongness. As a result, contractualism would also lack any critical potential for 
correcting our wrongness-judgments. Contractualism becomes an objectionable form of 
intuitionism as one of the critics has put it (MacLeod 2001, 283–8). 
The second version of the redundancy objection tries to argue that the reasons 
contractualism identifies as the reasons we have for not doing wrong acts are an unnecessary
addition to our space of moral reasons (Stratton-Lake 2003). Their existence relies on more 
fundamental moral reasons that already suffice to explain why we should not do acts that are 
wrong. If this was right, then claiming that the property of wrongness is the property of being 
                                                
22 For the reasons and relevance, I have omitted discussions about the three last chapters in Scanlon’s book. In 
these chapters, Scanlon applies his ethical theory to the debates in ethics about moral responsibility, promises 
and moral relativism (WWO, ch. 6–8).
23 This objection was first put forward by Judith Jarvis Thomson (Thomson 1990, 30, fn. 19, 188). It has since 
been repeated in various forms numerous times. For the references see Article 3 below. 
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forbidden by the contractualist principles on the basis that the reasons these properties provide 
are one and the same becomes suspect.  
My third article, “Contractualist Replies to the Redundancy objections” attempts to 
tackle these objections. It argues that the contractualist framework and especially the notion 
of justification can provide a criterion for the reasonable rejectability that is internal to the 
rationale of the view and does not rely on prior judgments about wrongness in an 
objectionable way. It also emphasizes the role of the practical deliberation procedures in 
providing critical potential to assess claims about which principles are reasonably rejectable.24
The second half of the paper argues that the reasons based on the relationship of ‘mutual 
recognition’ are not unnecessary but rather required. They are needed in certain circumstance 
to explain the strength and existence of our reasons not to do wrong acts.25
According to the second set of objections I tackle, the reasons Scanlon gives for not 
doing acts that forbidden by the non-rejectable principles are of wrong kind and too weak to 
be the reasons we have for not doing wrong acts.26 Again, if this objection was correct, 
Scanlon would be in no position to claim that he has correctly identified the property of moral 
wrongness. The first claim is based on the idea that virtuous moral agents are not guided by 
thoughts about wrongness per se but rather by considerations that make acts wrong – the pain 
of others, their disappointed expectations, and so on. Contractualism removes our attention 
from these considerations and thus makes us less virtuous. The second claim is based on the 
thought that the value of the relationship of ‘mutual recognition’ just is too weak against the
other values that conflict with the morality of right and wrong. My fourth article, 
“Contractualist Account of Reasons for Being Moral Defended”, attempts to argue that these 
objections too fail.
The last set of frequently discussed objections against contractualism questions the idea 
that the normative prescriptions of the view fit our intuitions about which acts are wrong and 
which right. These objections begin from the observation that, in the contractualist 
framework, only the objections which individuals can put forward on the basis of the features 
of their individual lives count in the reasonable rejectability. This restriction seems to make 
contractualism unable to provide appropriate moral guidance in moral choices where different 
                                                
24 This objection is also tackled in a different way in the Article 4, sec. 2.
25 An alternative reply for the same objection is given in the Article 4, sec. 3.
26 Bernard Williams made the first claim in an interview and Susan Mendus has argued for the second (see 
Voorhoeve (2004) and Mendus (2003)).
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sized groups are threatened by equally serious or almost equally serious harms for the 
individuals (Hooker 2003, Norcross 2002, Otsuka 2000, and Parfit 2004). In my fifth and 
final paper, “What We Owe to Many”, I attempt to argue that the contractualist framework,
with its individualist constraint on the reasons for rejecting principles, can correctly 
understood provide the right normative conclusions even for these difficult aggregation cases. 
If my answers to these seemingly strong objections against contractualism are along the 
right lines, then there is still good reason to believe that contractualism can provide an 
illuminating and plausible philosophical account of the notion of moral wrongness. I do not of 
course claim that my defense of the view provides its final vindication – far from it. Many 
interesting problematic features of the theory still remain to be discussed. I’m also certain that 
the view can still be clarified and improved in many ways. These tasks will have to wait until 
a later date. 
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